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This article offers an empirical examination of policies on the publication of
refugee law decisions in Canada’s Federal Court. In 2015, the Court issued a
notice describing the Court’s general practice of publishing written reasons in
cases that the deciding judge considers as having precedential value and of
issuing unpublished judgments in cases that the deciding judge does not view as
precedential. In 2018, the Court reversed course and issued a new notice. This
time, the Court indicated that all final decisions on the merits will be published.
Drawing on data obtained via automated data scraping processes from thousands
of online court dockets and from published decisions in cases involving refugee
judicial reviews, the article examines patterns in unpublished judgments and
published written reasons. Based on this analysis, the authors conclude that the
Court’s earlier policy of not publishing supposedly non-precedential decisions was
not successful and that this policy should not be replicated by other courts. Instead,
other courts should be encouraged to follow the Federal Court’s more recent
practice in this area, which entails publishing all final decisions on the merits.

Dans le présent article, nous proposons un examen empirique des politiques
relatives à la publication des décisions en matière de droit des réfugiés prononcées
par la Cour fédérale du Canada. En 2015, la Cour a publié un avis décrivant la
pratique générale de la Cour consistant à publier des motifs écrits dans les affaires
que le juge décideur considère comme ayant valeur de précédent et à produire
des jugements non publiés dans les affaires que le juge décideur ne considère pas
comme ayant valeur de précédent. En 2018, la Cour a fait volte-face et a publié
un nouvel avis. Cette fois, la Cour a indiqué que toutes les décisions finales sur le
fond seront publiées.
En s’appuyant sur des données obtenues par des processus de collecte de données
automatisés à partir de milliers de dossiers judiciaires en ligne et de décisions
publiées dans des affaires de contrôle judiciaire relatives aux réfugiés, l’article
examine les tendances dans les jugements non publiés et les motifs écrits publiés.
Sur la base de cette analyse, les auteurs concluent que la politique antérieure de
la Cour de ne pas publier les décisions censées ne pas faire jurisprudence n’a pas
été couronnée de succès et que cette politique ne devrait pas être reproduite par
d’autres tribunaux. Au contraire, les autres tribunaux devraient être encouragés à
suivre la pratique plus récente de la Cour fédérale dans ce domaine, qui consiste
à publier toutes les décisions finales rendues sur le fond.

*
Sean Rehaag is the Director of the Centre for Refugee Studies, the Director of the Refugee Law
Laboratory, and an Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
** Pierre-André Thériault is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Toronto.
This article draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada. The authors are grateful for the research assistance provided by Daniel Choi,
Alison Hanson, Elise Mercier, and Rachel Zaurov. They are also grateful for feedback provided on
an earlier version of the research by Professor Benjamin Berger, Dr Jonathan Khan, Justice James
O’Reilly and Andrew Baumberg (Legal Counsel at the Federal Court), as well as by anonymous
reviewers at the Dalhousie Law Journal.

2 The Dalhousie Law Journal

Introduction
I. Context
1. Judicial reason-giving
2. Unpublished decisions, no-citation rules and controlling
precedential value
3. Canadian examples of constraints on publication and
precedential value
4. Federal Court: Judicial review of inland refugee decisions
5. Federal Court: Judgments vs reasons
6. Federal Court: The 2015 Notice
7. Federal Court: The 2018 Notice
8. Conclusions from the context overview
II. Methodology
III. Research findings
1. What do unpublished decisions look like?
2. Frequency of unpublished refugee decisions on the merits
3. Different practices by individual Federal Court judges
4. Federal Court Liaison Committees Meetings
5. Citing unpublished decisions
6. Judge gender and unpublished decisions
Conclusion

Introduction
Should a judge deciding a case determine whether that decision has
precedential value in other cases? If so, and the judge is of the view that
the decision has no precedential value, should the reasons offered for
that decision be published? If reasons for the decision are not published,
should litigants who nonetheless manage to get a copy of the reasons,
and who disagree with the deciding judge about the decision not having
precedential value, be able to cite those reasons in subsequent cases? What
if different parties have differential access to unpublished decisions?
These questions are at the heart of a shift in policy at the Federal
Court of Canada. Prior to 2015, there was no formally articulated policy
at the Federal Court regarding the issuance of published written reasons
for decisions. In 2015, the Court issued a notice describing the court’s
general practices relating to publishing decisions. According to that
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notice, when the deciding judge considered a case as having precedential
value, the decision normally took the form of a “Judgment and Reasons,”
was published, and was made freely available to the public on the court’s
website. By contrast, if the deciding judge considered the case to be nonprecedential, the decision was instead issued in the form of a shorter,
“recital”-type “Judgment,”1 and judgments were normally not published
by the Court. A few years after the 2015 notice, however, the Federal Court
reversed course. In June of 2018, the court issued a new notice setting out
a policy of publishing all decisions on the merits.
The Federal Court’s change in policy regarding unpublished
judgments has thus far not been the subject of scholarly analysis. This
article seeks to shed light on this policy change through an empirical
study of Federal Court decision-making involving judicial reviews of
inland refugee determinations. The article draws on data about thousands
of Federal Court refugee decisions obtained through automated data
scraping techniques. Patterns in that data are explored, including changes
in the frequency of unpublished judgments over time, differences in rates
of unpublished judgments across judges, whether unpublished judgments
are cited in subsequent cases with published written reasons, and gender
differences in the rates at which different judges issue unpublished
judgments. The article’s overall aim is not just to enhance understanding
about the Federal Court’s shifting practices surrounding unpublished
judgments versus published reasons, but also to learn more generally
about what happens when judges are tasked with determining whether
cases that they decide have precedential value and whether they should be
made (easily) available to the public.
The article begins by setting out the context for the study. It then
moves on to discuss the study’s methodology. Next, the article sets out the
study’s findings. In brief, the article finds that: (1) unpublished judgments
and published written reasons took largely similar forms, with the main
difference (aside from publication) being that the former are shorter than the
latter; (2) the frequency of unpublished judgments increased significantly
in the years prior to the 2015 notice (reaching almost half of decisions
in 2015) and then sharply decreased shortly after the 2015 notice; (3)
the practices of individual judges varied substantially, with some judges
issuing unpublished judgments in most of the cases that they heard and
others never issuing unpublished judgments; (4) there were significant
gender differences in the dataset, with judges who use she/her pronouns
being much more likely to issue unpublished judgments than judges who
1.

Throughout the study period, unpublished final decisions were also sometimes labelled “Orders.”
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use he/him pronouns; (5) the 2015 notice prompted immediate pushback
from stakeholders who expressed concerns about fairness and differential
access to potentially precedent-setting unpublished decisions; and, finally,
(6) the concerns expressed by stakeholders appear to have been wellfounded in that several unpublished decisions were cited in subsequent
published decisions. Based on these findings, the article concludes that
the Federal Court’s earlier policy of not publishing supposedly nonprecedential decisions was not successful and that this policy should not
be replicated by other courts. Instead, other courts should be encouraged to
follow the Federal Court’s more recent practice in this area, which entails
publishing all final decisions on the merits—though we acknowledge that
this has resource implications that need to be addressed.
I.

Context

1. Judicial reason-giving
This article examines the Federal Court’s policies relating to preparing
and publishing reasons for decisions in the refugee law context. As such, a
helpful starting place is to consider why judges issue reasons and whether
they are required to do so.
The principle of reason-giving—and that of deliberation more
broadly—is considered a pillar of liberal-democratic theories.2 Judicial
reason-giving, in particular, is a defining characteristic of liberaldemocratic legal regimes.3 A variety of rationales have been offered to
support commitments to judicial reason-giving. Reasons promote the
principle that individuals should be treated not as mere objects of the
law, but as agents entitled to participate in the making of law. Reasons
encourage the acceptance of decisions and reinforce confidence in the
legal system. The act of writing reasons helps to ensure that decisions
are arrived at rationally—and, as such, reasons can be considered a
way to impose a form of self-discipline on judges. Reasons help parties
understand why a case was decided a certain way and demonstrate to the
parties that their arguments and evidence were taken seriously. Reasons
allow for meaningful appeals. Reasons are necessary for the development
of the common law through the principle of stare decisis. They also serve
an educational purpose by informing the legal community and others
about the content and evolution of legal rules.4
2.
Mathilde Cohen, “When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law
Approach” (2015) 72:2 Wash & Lee L Rev 483 at 496-497.
3.
Ibid.
4.
Ibid at 504-513. See also Jason Bosland & Jonathan Gill, “The Principle of Open Justice and the
Judicial Duty to Give Public Reasons” (2014) 38:2 Melbourne UL Rev 482 at 488-490.
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Many civilian legal jurisdictions have elevated judicial reason-giving
to a constitutional requirement.5 That has not generally been the case in
common law jurisdictions.6 As noted by Chief Justice McLachlin in R v
REM, “[t]he common law has historically recognized no legal duty upon a
tribunal to disclose its reasons for a decision or to identify what evidence
has been believed and what disbelieved.”7 Going back to the mid-1970s,
Chief Justice Laskin pushed the point further, suggesting that it may often
be undesirable for courts to offer reasons, especially in cases that merely
affirm an underlying decision.8
Michael Taggart attributes this historical reluctance to impose a
duty to provide reasons in common law jurisdictions to several factors.
Traditionally, the common law drew a distinction between formal orders
containing the judgment, which were entered in the record of the courts,
and reasons for judgment, which were not necessarily recorded. In
addition, judges did not routinely deal with factual matters in civil cases
until the advent of the judge-alone civil trial in the middle of the 19th
century—meaning that reasons would necessarily be incomplete in many
instances. Reasons were also not always regarded as necessary when the
role of the court was seen as primarily one of dispute resolution.9
This traditional common law position has evolved, however. In Canada,
the Supreme Court in Sheppard developed a functional test in the criminal
law context to assess whether reasons are adequate. The Court ruled that
reasons will only be considered adequate if, considering the entirety of
the court record, they fulfill their purpose, defined as being “reasonably
intelligible to the parties and provid[ing] the basis for meaningful appellate
review of the correctness of the trial judge’s decision.”10 The Supreme
Court also noted in Sheppard:
Reasons acquire particular importance when a trial judge is called
upon to address troublesome principles of unsettled law, or to resolve
confused and contradictory evidence on a key issue, unless the basis of
the trial judge’s conclusion is apparent from the record, even without

5.
Cohen, supra note 2 at 557.
6.
See HL Ho, “The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons” (2000) 20:1 Leg Stud 42 at 43-45; J
MacDonnell, “Reasons for Judgment and Fundamental Justice” in Jamie Cameron, ed, The Charter’s
Impact on the Criminal Justice System, (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at 151; Bosland & Gill, supra
note 4 at 490-493.
7.
R v REM, 2008 SCC 51 at para 8.
8.
Bora Laskin, “A Judge and His Constituencies” (1976) 7:1 Man LJ 1 at 3-4, cited in ibid.
9.
Michael Taggart, “Should Canadian Judges Be Legally Required to Give Reasoned Decisions in
Civil Cases?” (1983) 33:1 UTLJ 1 at 2- 3.
10. R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para 55.
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sheppard approach in a series of five
criminal law cases decided in 2008,12 and the case continues to be regularly
cited with approval in criminal law decisions.13 The Sheppard framework
has at times been applied outside the criminal law context, including in
family law litigation14 and civil litigation.15
At the same time, parallel developments in administrative law—
including through the Supreme Court’s famous Baker decision—have
resulted in norms of procedural fairness requiring administrative decisionmakers to provide reasons in many contexts where decisions significantly
impact a person’s rights.16 More recently, when the Supreme Court
reworked Canadian administrative law of judicial review in Vavilov, the
Court explicitly noted that the new framework aimed to “develop and
strengthen a culture of justification in administrative decision-making,”17
which will arguably further increase the circumstances in which reasons
are required. While the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the legal
doctrines related to the provision of reasons differ in the administrative
and judicial decision-making contexts, the Court has also stressed that
reasons “serve many of the same purposes” in both contexts.18 There are
also clear links between reasons in judicial and administrative decisionmaking: one of the purposes of reasons in judicial reviews is to provide
guidance for future administrative decision-making, both in specific cases
that are redetermined and in other future cases.
Overall, then, while it is probably still technically true that there is
no general obligation to provide reasons in Canadian common law, it
would also be accurate to say that in many circumstances reasons are
11. Ibid.
12. R v CLY, 2008 SCC 2; R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24; R v Walker, 2008 SCC 34; R v REM, supra
note 7; R v HSB, 2008 SCC 52. See Hamish Stewart, “The Trial Judge’s Duty to Give Reasons for
Judgment in Criminal Cases” (2009) 14:1 Can Crim L Rev 19.
13. See R v Spotted Eagle, 2021 ABCA 26 at para 19; R v ASP, 2021 ABCA 10 at para 8; R v
Makokis, [2020], 2020 ABCA 330 at para 17.
14. Lawson v Lawson (2006), 81 OR (3d) 321, 150 ACWS (3d) 422 (Ont CA).
15. See FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53 at paras 97-101; 1773907 Alberta Ltd v Davidson, 2017
ABCA 267 at paras 15-25; Waterway Houseboats Ltd v British Columbia, 2020 BCCA 378 at paras
378-379; Bruno v Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602 at paras 15-18. But see also Cojocaru v British Columbia
Women’s Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30 at para 25 (noting that the Supreme Court has not
clearly established the extent to which Sheppard applies in the civil litigation context).
16. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 43, 174
DLR (4th) 193. See also Mary Liston, “‘Alert, Alive and Sensitive’: Baker, the Duty to Give Reasons,
and the Ethos of Justification in Canadian Public Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of Public
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 113.
17. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 2 [Vavilov].
18. Ibid at para 79. See also R v Sheppard, supra note 10 at 18-19.
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now required, and that the scenarios where Canadian judges can issue
judgments without providing reasons appear to be narrowing.
2. Unpublished decisions, no-citation rules and controlling precedential
value
The next set of questions that are helpful to look at for the purposes of
this article involves whether judicial reasons should be published, whether
they should be citable in subsequent litigation, and whether judges should
be able to control the precedential value of decisions they issue.
For judicial reasons to achieve the full range of benefits described
above, reasons must not only be provided to the parties before the court,
they must also be made publicly available. That is because, as we have
seen, reasons do not only serve individual purposes involving the parties
in a particular case—i.e. facilitating appeals, showing parties that their
arguments and evidence were properly considered, etc. As Justice Binnie
noted in Sheppard, reasons also serve public purposes:
[T]he giving of reasoned judgments is central to the legitimacy of
judicial institutions in the eyes of the public. Decisions on individual
cases are neither submitted to nor blessed at the ballot box. The courts
attract public support or criticism at least in part by the quality of their
reasons.19

Justice Binnie recognized that reasons must be readily accessible to the
public in order to fulfill their public purpose:
Reasons for judgment are the primary mechanism by which judges
account to the parties and to the public for the decisions they render.
The courts frequently say that justice must not only be done but must be
seen to be done, but critics respond that it is difficult to see how justice
can be seen to be done if judges fail to articulate the reasons for their
actions. Trial courts, where the essential findings of facts and drawing of
inferences are done, can only be held properly to account if the reasons
for their adjudication are transparent and accessible to the public and to
the appellate courts.20

Another purpose served by making judicial reasons publicly available is,
of course, the development of the common law through precedent. As the
Supreme Court in Sheppard articulated, “[t]he development of the common
law proceeds largely by reasoned analogy from established precedents to

19. R v Sheppard, supra note 10 at para 5. See also R v REM, supra note 7 at paras 2, 12, 15; R v
Walker, supra note 12 at para 19; R v HSB, supra note 12 at para 8.
20. R v Sheppard, supra note 10 at 15.
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new situations.”21 Reasoning by analogy is only possible where a similar
case is known.22
Despite these compelling arguments about the importance of making
reasons available to the public, the publication of reasons has proven to be
a controversial issue in many common law jurisdictions. Long-standing
debates over the publication of reasons have largely been propelled by
concerns about judicial efficiency and about how the ever-increasing body
of case law might make the work of both judges and lawyers difficult.
These debates overlap with debates about whether courts should control
the precedential value of decisions they issue, whether through selective
publication or through other means.
Courts in several common law jurisdictions have enacted policies
designed to reduce the volume of cases cited in legal memoranda, and
these initiatives have often proven controversial.23 This phenomenon has
accelerated with the transition from selective and curated print reports to
expansive online databases that can potentially contain all cases across
many jurisdictions.24 As many courts lost control over the publication
of their decisions, some adopted “no-citation rules,” whereby legal
memoranda may only cite cases that are categorized as having precedential
value or are otherwise preselected by the issuing court.
In England, for example, general dissatisfaction with the state of
law reporting and the growth in reported case law goes back to the 19th
century. At the time, the existing law reports were considered to be costly,
overlapping, and of poor quality.25 In response, the Incorporated Council on
Law Reporting (ICLR) was established in 1864 and tasked with selecting
and publishing decisions of superior and appellate courts deemed worthy
of publication, such as those that introduce, modify, or settle a legal
principle, or that are otherwise “peculiarly instructive.”26 While the ICLR

21. Ibid at para 22.
22. See Martha J Dragich, “Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Problem?”
(1995) 44:3 Am U L Rev 757 at 770. See also Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 5.
23. See generally Susan Barker, “Law Reporting in England and the United States: History,
Controversy and Access to Justice” (2007) 32:4 Can L Libr Rev 178.
24. See Jonathan de Vries, “Legal Research, Legal Reasoning and Precedent in Canada in the Digital
Age” (2018) 48:1 Adv Q 1.
25. See Barker, supra note 23 at 179; Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System, 12th
ed (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2011) at 121.
26. See Paul Magrath, “Law Reporting and Public Access in the Courts: Is Too Much a Good Thing?
Part 1: The English Experience” (2019) 19:4 Leg Info Mgmt 224 at 227.
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did not have a monopoly on reporting decisions,27 practical considerations
limited the number of decisions published in commercial law reports.
As new technologies developed, however, English courts began to see
a dramatic proliferation of unreported cases in digital databases, leading
to revived concerns over increased citation to large numbers of cases.28
Courts responded by attempting to control when unreported cases could
be cited. For example, a Court of Appeal Practice Direction issued in
1996 required parties to seek leave to cite unreported decisions and leave
would only be granted if the statement of legal principle the unreported
decision contained was not found in a reported decision.29 In spite of
these restrictions, English judges continued to express concern about
the proliferation of citations to decisions that had not been subject to the
selective vetting of law reports.30 In response, in 2001, the Chief Justice of
England and Wales issued a new Practice Direction, noting that:
In recent years, there has been a substantial growth in the number of
readily available reports of judgments. …[T]he current weight of
available material causes problems both for advocates and for courts in
properly limiting the nature and amount of material that is used in the
preparation and argument of subsequent cases. …[E]fforts to increase
the efficiency, and thus reduce the cost, of litigation, whilst maintaining
the interests of justice, will be threatened if courts are burdened with a
weight of inappropriate and unnecessary authority, and if advocates are
uncertain as to the extent to which it is necessary to deploy authorities in
the argument of any given case.31

To address these concerns, the Practice Direction prohibited the citation
of several broad categories of decisions unless the judge issuing the
decision included a note stating that it was of precedential value.32 The
same Practice Direction also allowed judges issuing decisions in any type
of case to indicate that the case only applied the existing law to a factual
scenario and did not extend or add to the law. Litigants seeking to cite
27. Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process, 7th ed (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015)
at 298-299.
28. See e.g. Roberts Petroleum Ltd v Bernard Kenny Ltd, [1983] 2 AC 192 at 30-31, [1983] 1 All ER
564 (HL (Eng)).
29. Practice Note (Court of Appeal: Authorities), [1996] 3 All ER 382. See Lee Faircloth Peoples,
“Controlling the Common Law: A Comparative Analysis of No-Citation Rules and Publication
Practices in England and the United States” (2007) 17:2 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 307 at 316.
30. See e.g. Michaels v Taylor Woodrow Developments Ltd, [2000] 4 All ER 645 at para 79, [2001]
2 WLR 224 (UK ChD).
31. Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities), [2001] 1 WLR 1001, ss 1-2, [2001] 2 All ER 510
(EWCA (Civ Div)) [Practice Direction] [perma.cc/N3H2-AXHG]. See Jonathan Auburn, “The New
Rules on the Citation and Use of Authorities” (2001) 6:3 Judicial Rev 142.
32. Practice Direction, supra note 31, s 6.
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cases that included such indications were required to justify citing the
case.33 A more recent Practice Direction issued in 2012 states that “[a]n
unreported case should not usually be cited unless it contains a relevant
statement of legal principle not found in reported authority.”34
Despite these efforts to limit citation to unreported decisions in
England, it appears that at least some judges continue to be dissatisfied
with the ongoing proclivity of lawyers to cite unreported decisions—
including in the immigration law field. For example, in a 2019 Court of
Appeal decision, Lord Coulson noted:
Immigration and asylum work at all levels is bedevilled by the promiscuous
citation of authorities …in the hope that there might be something,
whether law, or fact or even comment, which might look roughly similar
to the case in question and therefore might assist the argument being
advanced. It is not unfair to dub it a ‘kitchen-sink’ approach to citation.
It is wholly illegitimate and merely adds to the workload of alreadystretched…judges. Proper limits on the citation of authorities in judicial
review cases are required if this blizzard of references to irrelevant, factdependant cases is ever going to be stopped.35

Along similar lines, in the US, extensive measures to restrict the publication
and citation of cases have also been pursued. As early as 1915, John B.
Winslow wondered how future judges and lawyers would cope with the
growth in the volume of available decisions, and recommended that no
opinion be written where only questions of fact are involved, or when
the case is determined by following existing legal principles.36 Grappling
with the same issue, in 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted a recommendation that “the judges of the courts of appeals and the
district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are
of general precedential value and that opinions authorized to be published
be succinct.”37 These and other similar proposed limits on publication
were driven by concerns about increasing caseload.38 Heller writes that
33. Ibid, s 7.
34. Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) (2012), [2012] 1 WLR 780 at 10, [2012] All ER 255
(UK Sen Cts) [perma.cc/N6HE-LKAC].
35. Kaur & Anor v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2019] EWCA Civ 1101 at para 23.
36. John B Winslow, “Courts and the Papermills” (1915) 10:3 Ill L Rev 157.
37. US, Administrative Office of The United States Courts, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, March 16-17, 1964 (Washington, DC: US Courts, 1964) at 11, online
(pdf): <www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1964-03_0.pdf> [perma.cc/A5US-QRDU]. See William
M Richman & William L Reynolds, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 11.
38. See Michael C Gizzi, “Examining the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of Appeals” (1993)
77:2 Judicature 96. See also Robert J Martineau, “Restrictions on Publications and Citation of Judicial
Opinions: A Reassessment” (1994) 28:1 U Mich JL Ref 119 at 119-120; Marjorie Lakin & Ellen
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restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions were viewed as
necessary for publication limits to achieve the aim of addressing caseload
challenges:
If unpublished opinions can be cited, judges might need to do more than
merely apply the facts to the law for the purpose of the parties involved
and instead provide a greater explanation as they do in published
opinions, thus taking more judicial time.39

No-citation rules were also considered by some to promote equal access
to the law:
[P]ermitting citation might unfairly advantage some (better resourced)
litigants over others. Since some large law firms have more money and
access to resources that index unpublished opinions, their clients could
presumably have an advantage over clients of small firms or pro se
litigants.40

By the late 1970s, all US federal courts had adopted or initiated plans to
limit publication and citation.41 These publication plans resulted in what
scholars have described as a system of “judicial triage,” whereby cases
selected for “Track One” received extensive court attention and resulted
in relatively lengthy footnoted decisions, while cases selected for “Track
Two” received less court attention, were not published, and could not be
cited in future litigation.42
This US practice, however, proved controversial. In 2001, the American
Bar Association stated that no-citation rules are “contrary to the best
interests of the public and the legal profession” and that courts of appeal
should “permit citation to relevant unpublished opinions.”43 Critiques
Perkins, “Realigning the Federal Court Caseload” (1979) 12:4 Loy LA L Rev 1001 at 1001-02;
Stephen L Wasby, “Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to
Publish” (2001) 3:1 J App Pr & Pro 325 at 325.
39. Deborah L Heller, “To Cite or Not to Cite: Is That Still a Question?” (2020) 112:4 Law Libr J 393
at 401.
40. Ibid.
41. See William L Reynolds & William M Richman, “The Non-Precedential Precedent: Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals” (1978) 78:6 Colum L Rev
1167 at 1168-1172.
42. See David C Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, “Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over
Unpublished Opinions” (2005) 62 Wash & Lee L Rev 1667 at 1667-1671.
43. American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, Criminal Justice Section, Tort and
Insurance Practice Section, Senior Lawyers Division, “Report to The House of Delegates” (2001)
recommendation 115 at 1, online (pdf): <www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/
annual-2001/2001_am_115.pdf> [perma.cc/8Q32-DPYV]. See Catherine P Best, “Everything Old Is
New Again: The Proliferation of Case Law and Whether There Is a Remedy” (Paper delivered at the
Law Via the Internet Conference, Montreal, 25-26 October 2007) at 13, online (pdf): <learning.uonbi.
ac.ke/courses/GPR100/document/Canada_ProliferationOfCaseLaw.pdf> [perma.cc/8MSY-UF8M]
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of no-publication/no-citation rules have also been voiced by American
Scholars. Charles Carpenter canvassed twenty-three such critiques,
including that prohibiting publication and citation promotes secrecy in the
judicial branch, that it creates a “shadowy” body of law accessible only
by certain parties, that it stifles the development of the common law, and
that it leads to shortcomings in the quality and consistency of decisionmaking.44 The practice was also subject to constitutional litigation. In
2000, the US Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit determined in Anastasoff
that the portion of a no-citation rule that declared unpublished opinion
non-precedential was unconstitutional—though this determination was
found to be moot shortly after it was issued.45 Attitudes towards the nocitation rule among the federal judiciary more generally also began to
shift around that time, leading the Appellate Rules Committee to vote to
change the rule in 2002.46 This process culminated in the adoption of rule
32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 2007—still in place
today—which forbids restrictions to citations of federal decisions.47 The
rule, however, is silent on the precedential value of unpublished decisions,
and some circuits have taken the position that unpublished decisions are
not precedential but merely have persuasive value.48
3. Canadian examples of constraints on publication and precedential
value
Canadian courts have thus far refrained from imposing no-citation rules.49
Such a policy, however, was briefly considered in British Columbia in the
early 1980s.50 Concerns surrounding the proliferation of full-text digests
led the Deputy Attorney General of British Columbia to commission the
Canadian Legal Information Council (CLIC) to conduct a study on the
[unpublished].
44. Charles E Carpenter Jr, “The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opinions: Do the Ends of
Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Secrecy?” (1998) 50:1 SCL Rev
235 at 247-248.
45. Anastasoff v United States, 223 F.(3d) 898 (8th Cir 2000), vacated as moot en banc in 235 F.(3d)
1054. See Salem M Katsh & Alex V Chachkes, “Constitutionality of No-Citation Rules” (2001) 3:1 J
App Pr & Pro 287. However, the following year, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reached an
opposite conclusion in Hart v Massanari, 266 F.(3d) 1155 (9th Cir 2001).
46. See Heller, supra note 39 at 403-404.
47. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 USCA, Rule 32.1 (1 January 2007) [perma.cc/LKW8LZMB].
48. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 37 at 69-71.
49. See de Vries, supra note 24 at 19. Note that our discussion in this section focuses on rules
that limit citation or that otherwise aim to control the precedential value of written decisions. Other
challenges arise in the context of oral decisions, where in practice there may be nothing to cite. For
a discussion of oral judgments, see JE Cote, “The Oral Judgment Practice in the Canadian Appellate
Courts” (2003) 5:2 J App Pr & Pro 435.
50. See Best, supra note 43 at 23-24.
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state of law reporting in the province.51 A draft report cautioned against
the possibility of “information overload,” and recommended that a
committee be charged with selecting cases to be reported. The report also
recommended adopting a no-citation rule, whereby practitioners would be
barred from referring to cases that had not been selected for publication.52
The report raised much concern,53 including with Deputy Attorney General
Richard Vogel himself, who stated that no-publication/no-citation rules
“attempt an inappropriate tidiness of the reported law,” and endorsed this
statement from Chief Justice Laskin:
To forbid the reporting of decided cases or certain classes of them is
unimaginable; they are public records, entitled to be recognized as such;
and their authority is no less if they are unreported, but disinterred from
the court registry.54

In light of the controversy, the proposal was not implemented, and
subsequent CLIC reports were much more critical of the no-citation rule.55
While Canadian courts have thus far refrained from adopting nocitation rules, they have adopted other mechanisms to control the
precedential value of their decisions. Two examples, from Alberta and
Ontario, offer a picture of the types of measures that Canadian courts have
taken to this end.
Since the early 1990s, the Alberta Court of Appeal has distinguished
between decisions issued as “Reasons for Judgment Reserved” and those
issued as a “Memorandum of Judgment.” In Hutterian Brethren Church of
Starland, Justice Côté explained:
Our Court will, on its own motion, require re-argument of cases before
larger panels, even the full Court, in appropriate cases. Any decision
labelled as ‘reserved’ will have been circulated, before final publication,
51. Richard Vogel, “The Attorney General’s Page” (1979) 37:5 Advocate 425 at 433. See Joan N
Fraser, “Case Law Reporting in British Columbia” (1993) 18:2 Can L Libr 47 at 51.
52. RM Dick, “Law Reporting in B.C.: A Review of the Recent Proposal” (1981) 39:3 Advocate 197
at 197.
53. Ibid at 199. See also Fraser, supra note 51 at 51.
54. Ibid.
55. A 1982 report from CLIC concluded:
…Models of selective publication and citation in the United States…are certainly not an
unqualified success and their complete acceptance is still not certain. …Limiting publication…
discourages the proliferation of official material but may actually encourage unofficial
publication unless supported by a ban on citation. Banning citation, however, leads to distrust
and apprehension on the part of the bar and may sometimes obscure significant case law. Judicial
timesaving is best promoted by early decision on the method of disposition and publishability yet
foreknowledge of the final precedential value of a case is not always possible (Shirley A Lounder,
“Case Law Reporting in Canada” (1982) Canadian Law Information Council Occasional Paper
no 4 at 70-71).
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to the entire Court for reaction on the question whether re-argument is
appropriate. (Other decisions are labelled either as ‘memorandum of
judgment’ or ‘memorandum of judgment delivered from the bench’.)
When a reserved judgment is published without re-argument, it is fair
to infer that the Court decided against re-argument, and therefore that
a substantial majority, if not all, the judges of the Court accepted the
statements of law in the decision.56

In other words, while Memorandums of Judgment, which were not
circulated beyond the panel of judges who heard the case, may reflect
only the views of the panel, Reasons for Judgment Reserved that were not
subject to re-argument can instead be taken to reflect not only the views of
the panel but also the majority of the members of the Court of Appeal—on
the theory that, because the reasons were circulated to all members of the
Court of Appeal and because the Court decided not to refer the matter for
re-argument, the majority of the members of the Court of Appeal must
implicitly have agreed with the decision.
Following the Hutterian Brethren Church decision, it became common
practice for Alberta Court of Appeal judges to accord more precedential
value to decisions styled as Reasons for Judgment Reserved than those
styled as a Memorandum of Judgment.57 However, a change in practice
in 1999 concerning the circulation of draft decisions led some judges to
push back against the approach set out in Hutterian Brethren Church. In R
v Fash, Justice Hetherington stated:
In the past this court has said that…a reserved judgment which is not a
dissenting judgment sets out views accepted by a majority of the members
of the court. …However, this is no longer the case. The practices of the
court have changed. Now…a reserved judgment which is not a dissenting
judgment sets out the views of a majority of the panel which heard the
appeal. It cannot be inferred that a majority of the members of the court
share those views.58
56. Hutterian Brethren Church of Starland v Starland No 47 (Municipal District) (1993), 9 Alta LR
(3d) 1 at para 52, 135 AR 304.
57. See for example R v Bonneteau (1994), 24 Alta LR (3d) 153 at para 15, 179 DLR (4th) 492:
“A reserved judgment which is not a dissenting judgment, is different. So far as statements of law
or principle are concerned, such a reserved judgment sets out views accepted by a majority of the
members of the court. It has substantial weight as precedent.”
58. 58 R v Fash (1999), 179 DLR (4th) 492 at para 7, [2000] 1 WWR 724. In R v Lee, 2012 ABCA
17, Justice Berger wrote at paragraph 66:
When a draft judgment is circulated to judges of the Court off the panel, not all members of the
Court will comment. Some will choose not to; others may be absent from the jurisdiction. Those
who do comment may offer suggestions which may or may not be adopted by the panel. Indeed,
if the majority of the members of the Court off the panel disagrees with the articulated principles
or statements of law set out in the draft, the panel is perfectly at liberty to issue its judgment
as it sees fit. Such a judgment which does not have the majority support of the members of the
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Some judges have even taken the position that the approach in Hutterian
Brethren Church was always misguided because it was never the case that
“circulated decisions” necessarily represented the views of a majority
of the bench.59 The debate remains ongoing, as some judges continue to
accord increased precedential value to decisions styled as Reasons for
Judgment Reserved.60
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s practice with regard to “endorsements”
—decisions deemed to be of lesser precedential value—illustrates the
converse approach.61 Justice Juriansz explained in Singh:
While all decisions of this court are binding, care must be taken to
avoid reading unwarranted jurisprudential principles into a decision of
the court rendered in an endorsement […which is] intended primarily
to simply pronounce a decision for parties who, having been present in
court during the argument of the appeal, will understand the thrust of the
court’s reasoning. When the court intends to articulate jurisprudential
principles for the first time, it does so in a written judgment.62

It should be noted, however, that this position on the limited precedential
value of Ontario Court of Appeal endorsements has not been unanimously
shared on the bench. For example, in the earlier case of Sinnadurai, Justice
Labrosse reasoned, “I know of no authority to support the proposition that
an order of a high court…‘made without reasons…’ is a lesser type of
order that can be overturned by a lower court.”63 Moreover, practice in
this area continues to shift in Ontario. In 2017, the Court of Appeal of

Court would nonetheless be labelled “Reasons for Judgment Reserved”—simply because it was
circulated.
See also R v White, 2008 ABCA 328 at paras 25-26; R v JLA, 2009 ABCA 344 at paras 8, 12;
R v Pucci, 2018 ABCA 149 at paras 13-17; Chauvet v Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board,
Appeals Commission), 2017 ABCA 155 at para 40; R v Robinson, 1999 ABCA 367 at para 69; Noble
v Principal Consultants Ltd (Bankrupt), 2000 ABCA 133 at paras 69-70; Enron Capital & Trade
Resources Canada Corp v Blue Range Resource Corp, 2000 ABCA 239 at paras 57-58; Blacklaws v
Morrow, 2000 ABCA 175 at paras 177-178; R v Black, 2014 ABCA 214 at para 12.
59. R v Beaudry, 2000 ABCA 243 at paras 34-44.
60. See for example R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363; R v Horton, 2006 ABPC 286; Blacklaws v
Morrow, supra note 58; R v Miles, 2011 ABCA 133; R v JLA, supra note 58.
61. See de Vries, supra note 24 at 18-19. See also Best, supra note 43 at 20-22.
62. R v Singh, 2014 ONCA 293 at para 12. See also R v Timminco Ltd (2001), 54 OR (3d) 21 at para
36, 144 OAC 231 (Ont CA); UCIT Online Security Inc v Maxion Construction Management – The
Uptown Inc, [2018] OJ No 5509 (QL) at para 34; R v Mehring, 2019 ONCJ 691 at para 38; North v
Metaswitch Networks Corp, 2017 ONCA 790 at para 46; R v Martin, 2016 ONCA 840 at paras 18-19;
R v Merritt, [2008], 78 WCB (2d) 266 at para 13, [2008] OJ No 1142 (QL) (Ont SC).
63. Laredo Construction Inc v Sinnadurai (2005), 78 OR (3d) 321 at para 20, 206 OAC 235 (Ont
CA). See also R v Labrecque, 2011 ONCA 360 at para 5; R v Dorn, 2010 ONSC 2631 at para 54. See
Best, supra note 43 at 21.
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Ontario discontinued the practice of issuing substantive final decisions as
“endorsements.”64
Overall, the debates and shifting practices in England, the US and
Canada that we have briefly overviewed demonstrate that attempts by
courts to limit the publication of decisions, to limit the citation of decisions
and to limit the precedential value of decisions as they are being issued
have typically been justified by pointing to efficiency and the workload of
judges, lawyers, and others who engage with the legal system. They also
typically generate pushback from scholars, lawyers, judges, and others.
As we shall now see, shifts in Federal Court practices in this area have
generated similar pushback for similar reasons.
4. Federal Court: Judicial review of inland refugee decisions
Before getting into the Federal Court’s publication and precedentcontrolling practices, it is worth first considering some of the key features
of Federal Court processes involving judicial review in the inland65 refugee
determination context.
Inland refugee claimants in Canada have their claim decided at
first instance by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration
and Refugee Board (IRB).66 Since 2012, some unsuccessful claimants
have access to an appeal at the Refugee Appeal Division of the IRB.
Unsuccessful claimants and the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and
Citizenship may both seek judicial review before the Federal Court of a
decision of the Refugee Appeal Division (or of the Refugee Protection
Division, in cases where an appeal is precluded).67
Judicial review in immigration matters is unique in that, before
getting their case heard, applicants must obtain leave to proceed with their
application.68 Federal Court judges normally do not issue reasons in leave
determinations, which are not appealable.69 The legal test for leave is not
defined in legislation and is rarely addressed in the jurisprudence of the
Federal Court. However, based on the few cases that have discussed the
leave requirement, the test for leave is, at least in theory, a permissive
one: leave should be granted if there is a “reasonably arguable case” (or
64. “Decisions of the Court of Appeal” (8 May 2017), online: Court of Appeal for Ontario <www.
ontariocourts.ca/decisions_index/en/> [perma.cc/U6T5-WUX3].
65. By “inland refugee determination context” we mean the adjudication of applications for refugee
protection made by claimants who are in Canada—in contrast to the assessment of applications for
refugee resettlement made by applicants overseas.
66. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 100 [IRPA]. For rules regarding when
applicants are eligible to have their claim referred to the Refugee Protection Division, see ibid, s 101.
67. Ibid, s 72.
68. Ibid, s 72(1).
69. Ibid, ss 72(2)(d), (e).
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conversely leave should only be denied where it is “plain and obvious”
that the applicant does not have a “reasonable prospect of success).”70
For cases that are granted leave, the Federal Courts Act provides that
the Federal Court may intervene in certain circumstances, including if
the Court determines that the decision-maker acted without jurisdiction,
failed to observe a principle of procedural fairness, erred in law, made an
erroneous finding of fact, acted by reason of fraud or perjured evidence,
or acted in another way that is contrary to law.71 Judicial review is also
subject to the administrative law jurisprudence on the standard of review.72
Just as the leave requirement restricts access to the full Federal Court
process in immigration law matters, there are similar limits on subsequent
appeals in cases that do get leave and go through the full process: parties
cannot appeal Federal Court immigration decisions that are decided on the
merits unless the Federal Court judge issuing the decision certifies that the
case raises a “[s]erious question of general importance” and specifies that
question.73
These limits on access to the full Federal Court system must be
understood in light of the volume of immigration decision-making. Canada’s
refugee determination process involves a large number of decisions, both
in administrative and judicial proceedings. At the administrative tribunal
level, for example, in 2019, 58,378 refugee claims were referred to the
IRB’s Refugee Protection Division and 42,491 refugee claims were
finalized.74 In the same year, the Federal Court received 3,123 applications
for judicial review involving refugee determinations and a further 4,659
applications for judicial review involving other types of immigration
matters. Refugee law judicial review applications represented 32.9 per
cent of all applications to the Federal Court that year—and immigration
70. Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?” (2012) 38:1
Queen’s LJ 1 at 9 [Rehaag, “Luck I”].
71. Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s 18.1(4).
72. See generally Vavilov, supra note 17.
73. IRPA, supra note 66 at s 74(d).
74. “Refugee Protection Claims (New System) by Country of Alleged Persecution: 2019” (last
modified 9 February 2021), online: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/
statistics/protection/Pages/RPDStat2019.aspx> [perma.cc/85PF-HGRS]. (Of the 42,491 claims
finalized in 2019, 25,034 claims accepted, 13,718 refused, and 3,739 otherwise resolved, resulting in a
64.6% recognition rate on the merits. In the same year, there were 11,817 appeals filed at the Refugee
Appeal Division and 8,684 appeals were finalized—with 5,746 appeals dismissed on the merits, 1,881
appeals granted, and 1,057 appeals otherwise resolved, resulting in a 24.7% appeal success rate on the
merits). “Refugee appeals statistics” (last modified 30 May 2022), online: Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/appeals/Pages/index.aspx> [perma.cc/KA5Q-3NYT].
For further discussion, see Angus Grant & Sean Rehaag, “Unappealing: An Assessment of the Limits
on Appeal Rights in Canada’s New Refugee Determination System” (2016) 49:1 UBC L Rev 203 at
220-223.
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and refugee cases combined represented 82 per cent of all applications.75
Empirical research has shown that almost all refugee judicial review
applications involve denials of refugee protection (rather than judicial
reviews of positive determinations), and that leave is denied in the large
majority of applications, meaning that most applications do not result in
written reasons.76
This article, then, deals with written reasons in a small proportion
(but large number) of inland refugee claims decided in Canada’s IRB that
resulted in an application for judicial review in Federal Court, where leave
was granted by the Federal Court because there was a reasonably arguable
case, and where there was a Federal Court decision granting or denying
the judicial review. The issue we are interested in is whether those Federal
Court decisions were published or unpublished.
5. Federal Court: Judgments vs reasons
There is no legislative or regulatory requirement that Federal Court judges
provide reasons in their decisions.77 Rule 392 of the Federal Courts Rules
provides that the Court “may dispose of any matter that is the subjectmatter of a hearing signing an order.”78 Rule 393 provides directions for
how a judge may deliver reasons for judgment. The Canadian Federal
Courts Practice commentary for rule 392 is explicit on the issue: “There
is no requirement that reasons must be given, either orally or in writing,
or that they be long or brief.”79 Despite the permissive language of the
Federal Courts Rules, the practice of the Federal Court is generally to
provide some form of reasons in judicial review applications decided on
the merits.80 In addition, the Federal Court of Appeal has endorsed, in
the context of judicial review, the Sheppard approach with regard to the
adequacy of reasons.81 Nonetheless, it remains the case that judges have a

75. “Statistics (31 December 2019)” (2020), online: Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/pages/
about-the-court/reports-and- statistics/statistics-december-31-2019> [perma.cc/7LMA-XCL6].
76. For further discussion, see Sean Rehaag, “Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations (II):
Revisiting the Luck of the Draw” (2019) 45:1 Queen’s LJ 1 [Rehaag, “Luck II”].
77. See above. There is also no general common law requirement for judges to provide reasons—
though in a growing number of decision-making contexts reasons may be required as a matter of
procedural fairness. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
78. Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, r 392 [emphasis added].
79. Roger T Hughes, Arthur B Renaud & Trent Horne, Canadian Federal Courts Practice, 2020 ed
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2019), commentary for rule 392.
80. “[J]udges and prothonotaries almost always provide reasons, either orally at the conclusion of
the hearing, such as a straightforward motion, or, if the matter is taken “under reserve,” as soon as
practicable after the hearing” (ibid).
81. See Canada v Brokenhead First Nation, 2011 FCA 148 at paras 30-34; Canada v Long Plain
First Nation, 2015 FCA 177 at para 143.
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great deal of discretion about the form that the decision takes (e.g. length,
level of detail, etc.).
6. Federal Court: The 2015 Notice
In June 2015, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court issued a Notice to
the Parties and the Profession outlining the Court’s policy with regard
to publishing decisions.82 The notice stated that final decisions that are
considered by the issuing judge “to have precedential value” normally
take the form of a “Judgment and Reasons,” receive a neutral citation, and
are posted on the Court’s website. Conversely, the notice provided that
final decisions considered by the issuing judge to have no precedential
value are normally issued in the form of a “Judgment” and are not posted
on the Court’s website.83 The notice went on to state:
The assignment of a neutral citation number to a decision, followed by
its publication, is indicative of the presiding judicial officer’s view that
the decision has precedential value. Similarly, the absence of a neutral
citation number and the fact that it is not published are indicative of the
presiding judicial officer’s view that the decision has no precedential
value.84

The 2015 notice did not place limits on citing unpublished cases, and
the Court’s position on the precedential value of unpublished cases
appeared less fixed than in some of the jurisdictions examined in previous
sections: the notice stated that the judge’s view on the precedential value
of a decision “does not preclude a party from taking a different position
regarding its precedential value.”85
7. Federal Court: The 2018 Notice
In June 2018, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court issued a further Notice
to Parties and the Profession on the issue, which explicitly replaced the
2015 notice.86 Under the new policy, Federal Court judges retain their
discretion in determining the type of decision they issue, but regardless
of the label, all final decisions are to be published: “[f]inal decisions on
82. “Notice to the Parties and the Profession: Publication of Decisions of Precedential Value” (19
June 2015), online (pdf): Federal Court <web.archive.org/web/20170505222639/http://cas-cdcwww02.cas-satj.gc.ca/fct-cf/pdf/Notice%20to%20the%20Profession%20-%20Precedential%20
vs%20non-precedential%20decisions%20FINAL%20(ENG).pdf> [perma.cc/8TXU-2XNQ].
83. Ibid (The same principle is said to apply to interlocutory decisions).
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. “Notice to the Parties and the Profession: Publication of Court Decisions” (1 June 2018),
online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct- cf.gc.ca/content/assets/pdf/base/Notice%20to%20the%20
Profession%20-%20publication%20of%20decisions%20final%20(ENG)%20final.pdf>
[perma.
cc/7XSX-R4SR].
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the merits are published on the Court’s website, with the exception of
decisions issued following consent between parties, which are usually
of no precedential value.”87 The Court recognizes in the notice that the
“[e]ffective availability of relevant Court decisions furthers the open
court principle and is, ultimately, an access to justice issue.”88 The notice
further explains that the change in practice results from “discussions with
members of the Bar.”89
8. Conclusions from the context overview
As we have seen, longstanding debates—especially in the US and
England, but also to a lesser extent in Canada—over the publication of
court decisions pit the principle of open justice against practical concerns
over the efficiency of the justice system. Courts that have attempted
to limit the publication and citation of their body of cases have faced
significant opposition by members of the bar, dissent within the bench
and, sometimes, admonishment from higher courts.90
With that context in mind—and also keeping in mind the general
structure of judicial review of refugee decision-making—the remainder
of this article will examine the Federal Court’s shifting practices relating
to the publication of reasons, focusing on refugee law cases. Drawing on
a dataset of over forty thousand Federal Court applications, the following
sections examine patterns in the issuance of unpublished decisions at the
Federal Court in the inland refugee context, including changes over time
and variations between individual judges. We ask what the data tells us
about whether unpublished cases have, in fact, “no precedential value.”
We also investigate what were the “discussions with members of the Bar”
that encouraged the Federal Court to depart from the practice described in
the 2015 notice.
II. Methodology
The no-citation and no-publication practices in the US—where there is
a long tradition of empirical legal scholarship—have been the subject
of extensive empirical research, including several studies of patterns
in when judges decide whether their decisions have precedential value,
and studies that seek to identify the body of decisions missing from all

87. Ibid. The Federal Court also announced that both interlocutory decisions issued with formal
reasons (“Order and Reasons”) and interlocutory decisions issued on a motion for stay of removal
would be available on CanLII.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. See sections I.2 and I.3.
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legal databases.91 For example, David S. Law undertook an empirical
examination of all cases decided by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal over
a ten-year period, and found significant correlations between judges’
ideology, outcomes, and whether cases are declared to have precedential
effect—essentially concluding that some judges use the ability to declare
cases to be of precedential value to advance their preferences.92 A study by
Elizabeth A. Tillman and Rachael K. Hinkle found correlations between
the gender and race of judges and the likelihood that they author published
versus unpublished decisions, with white male judges being more likely
to author decisions designated as having precedential value and thus being
published.93 A more recent study by Keith Carlson, Michael A. Livermore,
and Daniel N. Rockmore went further, finding that large swaths of US
quantitative empirical legal scholarship on judicial decision-making are
based on biased datasets because scholars have relied mostly on published
decisions and because published decisions are not representative of
judicial decision-making—meaning that many of the inferences drawn
in prior research are suspect.94 Empirical studies on selective reporting
have also been conducted, but to a lesser extent, in the English context.95
To our knowledge, however, no empirical legal scholarship has examined
91. See e.g. Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill & Fatma Marouf, “Invisible Adjudication in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals” (2018) 106:3 Geo LJ 683; Merritt E McAlister, “Missing Decisions” (2020) 169:4
U Pa L Rev 1101; Elizabeth Y McCuskey, “Submerged Precedent” (2016) 16:2 Nev LJ 515; Peter
Siegelman & John J Donohue III, “Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published
and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases” (1990) 24:5 Law & Soc’y Rev 1133; Brian
N Lizotte, “Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District
Courts” [2007] 2007:1 Wis L Rev 107; Elizabeth Y McCuskey, “Clarity and Clarification: Grable
Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders” (2012) 91:2 Neb L Rev 387; Denise M Keele et al,
“An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions” (2009) 6:1 J
Empirical Leg Stud 213; Christina L Boyd, Pauline T Kim & Margo Schlanger, “Mapping the Iceberg:
The Impact of Data Sources on the Study of District Courts” (2020) 17:3 J Empirical Leg Stud 466;
David Hoffman, Alan J Izenman & Jeffrey R Lidicker, “Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine”
(2007) 85:4 Wash UL Rev 681; Evan J Ringquist & Craig E Emmert, “Judicial Policymaking in
Published and Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation” (1999) 52:1
Political Research Q 7; Merritt E McAlister, “‘Downright Indifference’: Examining Unpublished
Decisions in the Federal Appellate Courts” (2020) 118:4 Mich L Rev 533; Michael Hannon, “A Closer
Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals” (2001) 3:1 J App Pr & Pro
199; Deborah Jones Merritt & James J Brudney, “Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals” (2001) 54:1 Vand L Rev 69.
92. David S Law, “Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the
Ninth Circuit” (2005) 73:3 U Cin L Rev 817 at 843-863.
93. Elizabeth A Tillman & Rachael K Hinkle, “Of Whites and Men: How Gender and Race Impact
Authorship of Published and Unpublished Opinions in the US Courts of Appeals” (2018) 5:1 Research
& Politics 1 at 4-6.
94. Keith Carlson, Michael A Livermore & Daniel N Rockmore, “The Problem of Data Bias in the
Pool of Published U.S. Appellate Court Opinions” (2020) 17:2 J Empirical Leg Stud 224 at 254-257.
95. See Burton M Atkins, “Selective Reporting and the Communication of Legal Rights in England”
(1992) 76:2 Judicature 58.
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publication practices in Canada. This article aims to begin filling this gap
by looking at the Federal Court’s shift in practice relating to publishing
written reasons. To do so, this article uses four main methodologies.
One methodology we used was a standard legal analysis of legislation,
practice notices, case law, and secondary materials. This included
reviewing prior scholarly research as well as materials produced by
the Federal Court. Using these materials, we sought to develop a better
understanding of the law and officially articulated policies surrounding
unpublished judgments and published written reasons, as well as some of
the arguments offered about practices in this area.
The second methodology involved using automated processes to
gather data from online Federal Court dockets.96 This online system97
includes structured information about each application for judicial review
in the Federal Court, such as the docket number, filing date, nature of
cause, office, and language. The online docket also includes information
set out in natural language about each step in the process, such as when a
document is filed, which judge is assigned, the decision that is made, and
so on. Using a computer program written in Python,98 we scraped data from
all dockets for cases that the Federal Court categorized as applications for
judicial review in refugee matters arising in Canada. The Python program
then parsed the data from the dockets, which included gathering specific
datapoints from natural language entries in the dockets. The result is a
dataset with datapoints on each application for judicial review in refugee
law matters arising in Canada that includes: docket number, style of
cause, whether the applicant is the government or the claimant, when the
application was filed, whether the application was perfected, whether the
application was opposed, whether the applicant withdrew the application,
the date of the leave decision, the judge deciding leave, and the leave
outcome. In cases where leave was granted, the datapoints also include:
whether the applicant withdrew the application, whether the respondent
consented to the application, the date of the hearing, the date of the
decision on the merits, the name of the judge deciding on the merits, and
the outcome on the merits. This dataset includes 44,393 applications for

96. See Rehaag, “Luck II,” supra note 76, for further discussion about this methodology.
97. “Court Files” (last visited 14 June 2022), online: Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/courtfiles-and-decisions/court-files> [perma.cc/T38M-6QA3].
98. The program is a substantially revised version of code initially written by Samuel Norris for
a project on immigration judicial reviews. See Samuel Norris, “Examiner Inconsistency: Evidence
from Refugee Appeals” (2019) University of Chicago Becker Friedman Institute for Economics
Working Paper No 2018-75, online (pdf): <bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_201875.
pdf> [perma.cc/BQ54- 585R].
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judicial review of refugee determinations filed in the Federal Court from
2006 to 2018.
The third methodology involved gathering the full text of all refugee
judicial review decisions made between 2007 and 2018 that are available
on the Federal Court’s online decision webpage.99 Again, a Python program
was used to collect each of these decisions (3,878 decisions).
The fourth methodology was to examine a random sample of 50
unpublished refugee judicial review judgments on the merits.100 Because
we were primarily interested in how judgments without reasons were
being used from 2011 to 2018 (the period that, as we will see below,
corresponds with significant shifts in the frequency of such decisions),
we used the combined datasets above to identify all the refugee judicial
review decisions decided on the merits without published written reasons
during this period (768 decisions). We then randomly selected 50 of these
decisions.101 Next, we visited the Federal Court Registry to access the
physical court files for these decisions, we made scans of the reasons for
judgments contained in the files, and we then reviewed those reasons.
III. Research findings
1. What do unpublished decisions look like?
The format and content of the sample of unpublished decisions differed
from the usual format of decisions issued as “Judgments and Reasons.”
Published decisions issued as Judgments and Reasons typically included
an introduction, a summary of the decision under review, a summary of
the position of the parties, an analysis that references relevant case law
and legislation, and a conclusion.102 The unpublished judgments we
reviewed were shorter and some contained sections written in a pointform structure.103
That being said, we found that the unpublished decisions were by no
means devoid of factual and legal analysis, nor were they excessively short.
They ran on average 18 paragraphs. The longest unpublished decision in
the random sample was 16 pages long with 59 paragraphs. All but 7 of the
99. “Decisions of the Federal Court” (last modified 14 June 2022), online: Federal Court <decisions.
fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/en/nav.do> [perma.cc/QMA5-K25P].
100. This sample size was a somewhat arbitrary decision. We wanted a large enough set of cases to
allow us to get a general understanding of what unpublished decisions look like, but because of the
time involved in obtaining, digitizing, and verifying the decisions, we did not want to work with a
large dataset.
101. We used Excel’s RANDBETWEEN function to do so.
102. See e.g. Horvath v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 147.
103. Many decisions adopted the form “Upon…and upon…” or “Whereas…and whereas….” The
Federal Court sometimes refers to these types of decisions as “recital”-type decisions.
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50 unpublished decisions referred to case law. All unpublished decisions
described the crux of the case under review, and the majority presented a
summary of the positions taken by the applicant.
In sum, the vast majority of unpublished decisions we reviewed were
not qualitatively different than published decisions; they were rather only
shorter.
2. Frequency of unpublished refugee decisions on the merits
Table 1 sets out the frequency with which the Federal Court issued
decisions on the merits without published reasons. The Table (as well as
Tables 2-3 and Charts 1-2 below) include only cases where the application
was filed from 2006 to 2018 and the decision was made between 1 January
2007 and 31 May 2018. In addition, cases are only included where the
applicant was a refugee claimant (i.e. excluding applications brought by
the government), where the Federal Court granted leave, and where the
judicial review was decided on the merits (i.e. excluding applications that
were discontinued or that were decided on consent).
As can be seen in Table 1, of the 5,439 refugee judicial review
decisions on the merits during the period of the study, 27 per cent were
issued without published reasons. Moreover, the frequency with which
the Federal Court made unpublished refugee judicial review decisions on
the merits fluctuated significantly during the period of this study. Between
2007 and 2010, rates were fairly steady, in the 15 per cent to 20 per cent
range. From 2011 to 2015, the frequency of unpublished refugee judicial
review decisions on the merits increased, going from 21 per cent in 2011
to 49 per cent in 2015. At that point, the frequency of unpublished judicial
review decisions fell sharply to 19 per cent in 2016, 9 per cent in 2017,
and 6 per cent in the first half of 2018. It appears evident, then, that during
the period of the study—and especially between 2011 and 2017—Federal
Court practices relating to unpublished refugee judicial review decisions
on the merits underwent important shifts.
As can also be seen in Table 1, overall the rates at which judicial
review decisions on the merits were unpublished were fairly similar in
cases where judicial review was denied (25.3 per cent) and in cases where
judicial review was granted (28.2 per cent).
Chart 1 shows the relationship between the number of refugee judicial
review decisions on the merits at the Federal Court by year and the
percentage of these decisions that were unpublished in that year. There
appears to be a strong, albeit not perfect, correlation between increases
in caseload and increases in the proportion of unpublished decisions
(R2=0.6035). This would seem to suggest that perhaps part of the reason
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for shifts in Federal Court practices in this area relates to the Court (or
individual judges) struggling to manage caseload.
3. Different practices by individual Federal Court judges
Table 2 breaks down figures on the frequency of unpublished refugee
judicial review decisions on the merits for individual Federal Court
judges. The table covers only the 2013 to 2015 period, which was selected
because it is the period covered by the study with the highest frequency
of unpublished decisions. The table only includes individual judges who
decided 30 or more refugee judicial reviews on the merits during this
period.
As can be seen in Table 2, individual judges had vastly different
practices relating to unpublished decisions on the merits during the 2013
to 2015 period. Some judges almost always issued unpublished decisions,
including Justice St-Louis (98 per cent), Justice McVeigh (97 per cent),
and Justice Heneghan (96 per cent). By contrast, some judges never issued
unpublished decisions, including Justice Phelan (0 per cent), Justice Noël
(0 per cent), and Justice LeBlanc (0 per cent). The remaining judges are
spread out fairly evenly between these two extremes.
Clearly, there were divergent understandings on the Court during this
period about when it would be appropriate to issue refugee judicial review
decisions on the merits without published reasons.
4. Federal Court Liaison Committees Meetings
One particularly striking finding of this study is that changes in Federal
Court practices relating to unpublished refugee judicial review decisions
on the merits appeared to precede, rather than follow, the notices that
the Court issued on the subject. As can be seen in Chart 2, Federal Court
judges were increasingly issuing unpublished decisions before the 2015
notice formally articulated this practice. Then, shortly after the 2015
notice, Federal Court Judges mostly stopped issuing unpublished refugee
judicial review decisions on the merits—and yet it took several years for
the Court to issue its revised 2018 notice requiring that all decisions on the
merits be published.
We tried to learn more about the impetus behind the 2015 and
2018 notices. We did so by looking at minutes from the Federal Court’s
Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Law Bar Liaison Committee
meetings. We also reviewed the minutes of the meetings of the Court’s other
liaison committees: the Canadian Bar Association Liaison Committee, the
Indigenous Bar Association—Aboriginal Law Bar Liaison Committee,
the Intellectual Property Law Bar Liaison Committee, the Montreal Bar
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Liaison Committee, and the Labour Law, Human Rights, Pension Benefits,
Privacy and Access Review Liaison Committee.104
Our review revealed that the partial publication of Federal Court
decisions was a frequent grievance from members of the bar. At a November
2006 meeting of the Canadian Bar Association Liaison Committee, one
immigration lawyer stated, with regard to decisions on motions for a stay
of removal:105
Although unpublished, DOJ keeps copies and cites them even though
they are not accessible: [this is] “not a level playing field.” If [the
decisions are] precedents, these should be published.106

Another lawyer noted at a November 2007 meeting of the Citizenship,
Immigration and Refugee Law Bar Liaison Committee that “in some
cases, lawyers are disciplined if they cite…speaking orders.”107 There was
also a discussion at the same meeting about “whether it was for the Court
to decide whether an order was of precedential value or not.”108
More recently, the issue of the unavailability of some decisions was
raised at a May 2014 meeting of the Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee
Law Bar Liaison Committee:
It was noted that most interlocutory Orders are not available to the
private Bar. …One member of the Bar explained that in her experience,
some judges will not accept something as a “serious issue” unless a
previous judge had already reached a similar conclusion. Some judges
have indicated that they do not rely on previous orders. …Justice Zinn
noted an example of a case where a previous [unreported] decision did
have precedential value.109

104. The minutes of Federal Court liaison committee meetings are available on the Court’s website.
Federal Court, “Liaison Committees” (last modified 14 April 2019), online: Federal Court <www.
fct-cf.gc.ca/en/pages/about-the-court/liaison-committees> [perma.cc/QB3V-5URR].
105. Decisions on a motion for a stay of removal, as interlocutory decisions, were not covered by our
statistical analysis.
106. Federal Court of Appeal & Federal Court, “Bench and Canadian Bar Association Liaison
Committee Minutes of Meeting” (3 November 2006) at 3, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.
gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/ABC-CBA-2006-11.pdf> [perma.cc/D2KE-AJG9].
107. “Bench and Bar (Immigration and Refugee Law) Liaison Committee Minutes of Meeting” (23
November 2007) at 2-3, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/
IMM-11-2007-ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/FY8W-9DFY].
108. Ibid at 3.
109. “Bench & Bar Liaison Committee (Citizenship, Immigration & Refugee Law) Minutes” (9 May
2014), online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/IMM%20Bar%20
9-may-2014%20minutes%20ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/RW68-XYTU].
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The minutes of the following meeting in January 2015 reveal that
the Federal Court was moving towards some kind of formal policy for
publishing decisions:
Chief Justice Crampton indicated that the Court is looking at this
internally with respect to the release of different types of Orders. Orders
that are released as ‘endorsements’ (ie, a series of “whereas” clauses
followed by the conclusion) do not have precedential value, particularly
given the lack of a factual foundation set out in the Order. …Chief Justice
Crampton responded that the Court first needs to clarify its position with
respect to precedential versus non-precedential decisions. The Court is
trying to get shorter oral or written decisions out more quickly for access
to justice reasons. …Chief Justice Crampton noted the overabundance
of jurisprudence. It does not seem to be helpful to add cases of little
precedential value to this body of cases.110

The first notice to the profession was issued six months later in June
2015. The minutes of the Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Law Bar
Liaison Committee meetings show that the Federal Court faced significant
pushback from the bar immediately following the issuance of the notice:
CJ Crampton noted that this issue first came up in the Immigration and the
Intellectual Property liaison committees, with the Bar asking for greater
clarity as to when a decision gets a neutral citation and when not. The
Notice was issued in response, but has provoked considerable discussion
and debate. …He had hoped that one outcome would be simply for the
Department of Justice to discontinue using non-published decisions, but
this is not happening: he acknowledged that some decisions appear to
be relevant on precedential grounds. There will be another discussion
within the Court regarding the Notice.111

At the following Committee meeting in April 2016, the Chief Justice
announced a complete policy reversal, whereby all final judgments would
be published regardless of precedential value.112 The Court’s formal policy
was not changed for a further two years.
The minutes of the liaison committees meetings also reveal that the
concern over the supposedly needless proliferation of non-precedential
110. “Bench & Bar Liaison Committee (Citizenship, Immigration & Refugee Law) Minutes” (6
January 2015), online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/IMM%20
Bar%206-jan-2015%20minutes%20ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/M5DH-SA2F].
111. “Bench & Bar Liaison Committee (Citizenship, Immigration & Refugee Law) Minutes” (10
November 2015) at 3-4, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/
IMM%20Bar%2010-NOV-2015%20minutes%20ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/A82G- TAS9].
112. “Bench & Bar Liaison Committee (Citizenship, Immigration & Refugee Law) Minutes” (8 April
2016) at 2, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/IMM%20Bar%20
8-APRIL-2016%20minutes%20ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/69VN-XD9S].
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jurisprudence was not the only motivation for restricting publication.
The cost of translation was also repeatedly mentioned by the Court as
an important constraint. Under section 20 of the Officials Languages
Act, federal courts are required to make available any final decisions in
both official languages.113 At over a dozen meetings, both judges and staff
reported that the Court lacked resources to translate all decisions.114 As
indicated by a Federal Court legal counsel, “the Federal Court does not
publish any decision unless it will also be translated.”115 Encouraging
judges to issue unpublished judgments—which are not translated—may
have been used by the Court as a method to control translation costs. The
Federal Court’s 2014–2019 Strategic Plan notes that it was confronted
with “scarce judicial resource” and that it planned to “[f]acilitate the just,
expeditious and efficient resolution of matters, among other things by:
…making greater use of oral decisions and short written Endorsements,
where appropriate.”116

113. Official Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp), s 20 [OLA]. Under section 20 of the OLA,
any final decision that “determines a question of law of general public interest or importance” is to be
released in both languages “simultaneously” unless the simultaneous release “would occasion a delay
prejudicial to the public interest or resulting in injustice or hardship to any party to the proceedings
leading to its issuance.” All other decisions are to be released in the other official language “at the
earliest possible time.” It is worth noting that, during the study period, a disagreement existed between
the Federal Court and the Commissioner of Official Languages with regard to the interpretation of
the OLA. The Commissioner took the position that the posting of a decision on the Court’s website
constitutes an administrative communication with the public, as opposed to a judicial activity, thus
triggering the application of Part IV of the OLA, and with it the obligation to post all decisions in
both official languages simultaneously. See “Report to Parliament of the Commissioner of Official
Languages on the Investigation into the Courts Administration Service under Subsection 65(3) of the
Official Languages Act” (November 2016) at 8, online (pdf): Office of the Commissioner of Official
Languages <www.clo- ocol.gc.ca/sites/default/files/special-report-cas.pdf> [perma.cc/4SG6-GPG6].
114. See e.g. in May 2011 meeting, acting Chief Justice Noël made reference to “the challenges that
the Courts are facing with respect to translation of decisions and the interpretation regarding the legal
requirements for translation by the Commissioner of Official Languages” (Federal Court of Appeal
& Federal Court, “Bench and Canadian Bar Association Liaison Committee Minutes” (20 May 2011)
at 9, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/ABC-CBA-2011-05minutes(E).pdf> [perma.cc/T98E-CQ4F]). More recently, the Chief Justice explained that “the Court
does not receive enough funding for translating decisions, which presents a problem for a bilingual
and bijural institution” (“Liaison Committee with the Federal Court of Appeal and Federal Court
Meeting” (28 March 2018) at 2, online (pdf): Barreau de Montréal <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/Content/assets/
pdf/base/3858446_2018-03-28cr%20-%20Mars%2027.pdf> [perma.cc/G66W-75WR]).
115. Federal Court of Appeal & Federal Court, “Labour Law, Human Rights, Pension Benefits,
Privacy and Access Review Liaison Committee” (22 June 2016) at 4, online (pdf): Federal Court
<www.fctcf.gc.ca/Content/assets/pdf/base/Liaison%20Committee%20June%2022%202016%20
minutes%20FINAL%20(ENG).pdf> [perma.cc/T24T-EH6Y].
116. “Strategic Plan 2014–2019” at 2, 6, online (pdf): Federal Court <www.fct-cf.gc.ca/content/
assets/pdf/base/Strategic%20Plan%20(Final%20for%20posting%20with%20COA%20and%20
accessibility)%20English. pdf> [perma.cc/9E52-GF7U].
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Starting in 2017, the four Federal Courts administered by Courts
Administration Services received increases in their translation budget.117
It seems possible that these investments in translation services during
the period of policy change discussed in this article may have made the
Court’s new practice of publishing nearly all final decisions viable.
Based on this review, it appears that the 2015 notice, which at the outset
of this research we imagined as a new policy, was mostly an attempt by
the Court to provide stakeholders with a clearer understanding of existing
practices. However, once the 2015 notice brought increased attention
to those practices, the pressure to change them mounted—so much so
that within months of the 2015 notice the Court informally changed its
publishing practices. The Court then formally recognized these revisions
as policy in its 2018 notice, which is a period that coincided with increased
investment in resources for translating Federal Court decisions.
5. Citing unpublished decisions
We were interested in seeing whether there was evidence to substantiate
the concerns raised at the Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Law Bar
Liaison Committee about unpublished decisions being used as precedents.
To this end, we wrote a computer program in Python that searched the full
text of all 3,878 published refugee judicial review decisions on the merits
from 2007 to 2018 for citations to the 1,463 unpublished judicial review
decisions on the merits in our dataset. We found 56 instances where a
published decision cited an unpublished decision.
In several of these cases, it is clear from the Federal Court decision
that Department of Justice counsel raised the unpublished decisions,
including as the basis for broad legal principles. Consider, for example,
the following passage in a Federal Court decision:
The Respondent submits that the standard of review for this Decision is
reasonableness. When a Board’s decision is based on an assessment or
weighing of facts before it, the decision is only reviewable where it is
based on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse or capricious
manner or without regard to the material before it. The Board should be
117. See Marie-Eve Hudon, “Bilingualism in Canada’s Court System: The Role of the Federal
Government” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2017), No 2017-33-E at 13, online (pdf): Library of
Parliament <lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/
PDF/2017-33-E.pdf> [perma.cc/BBQ2-BCHZ]; “2017–18 Annual Report” at 22, online (pdf): Courts
Administration Services <www.cas- satj.gc.ca/en/publications/ar/2017-18/pdf/Annual_Report_Final_
EN.pdf> [perma.cc/A9G9-CUSS]; “2018–19 Departmental Results Report” (2020) at 6, online
(pdf): Courts Administration Services <www.cas-satj.gc.ca/en/publications/dpr/2018-19/pdf/201819_DRR_CAS_WEB_EN.pdf> [perma.cc/Z64S-ECYS]; “2018–19 Annual Report” at 6, 25-26,
online (pdf): Courts Administration Services <www.cas-satj.gc.ca/en/publications/ar/2018-19/pdf/
CAS_2018-19_Annual%20Report_EN_Web.pdf> [perma.cc/GQ28-BPJ5].
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accorded appropriate deference given its role as a specialized tribunal.
See: Pratap v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (26
March 2008) IMM-3500-07 (F.C.) [unpublished].118

Other Federal Court decisions note that counsel for the Department of
Justice cited unpublished decisions in relation to more specific factual
findings, such as to support a finding relating to the availability of state
protection in a particular country.119
Several Federal Court decisions show that counsel for refugee
claimants also cite unpublished decisions both for broad legal principles
and for specific factual scenarios. For example, in one decision, the Federal
Court noted that counsel for a refugee claimant cited two unpublished
decisions to guide the Court on how to review credibility determinations:
the applicant submits […that] the Federal Court has consistently stated
that negative credibility findings must be made in clear and unmistakable
terms and the Board is required to give clear and cogent reasons for
rejecting credibility (see Wilanowski v Canada (Minister of Employment
and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 371, 154 NR 205 (FCA)). He cites
Rayappu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (24
October 2012), IMM-8712-11 (FC) at paragraphs 2 to 7 [Rayappu] and
Sinnathamby v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (21
January 2013), IMM-3828- 12 at paragraphs 3 and 4 [Sinnathamby]
for support. He submits the present case is indistinguishable from
Rayappu.120

In other Federal Court cases, counsel for refugee claimants cited
unpublished decisions in connection with particular factual situations,
including to support arguments about a government imputing political
opinions against refugee claimants who were known to have travelled to
Canada as part of a high profile maritime group arrival,121 to challenge
findings about generalized risk,122 and to dispute instead of push back
against the Board’s rejection of a claimant’s explanation for failing to
make a refugee claim in a country of transit.123

118. Huang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 751 at para 22, citing IMM-3500-07.
119. See e.g. Park v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 353 at para 22, citing IMM576-10.
120. Thevathasan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 668 at para 23, citing IMM8712-11 & IMM-3828-12.
121. B198 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1106 at para 42, citing IMM-8010-12.
122. Servellon Melendez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 700 at para 26, citing
IMM-4180-11.
123. Ramanathan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 319 at para 25, citing IMM3966-12.

Judgments v Reasons in Federal Court Refugee Claim
Judicial Reviews: A Bad Precedent?

31

There are also some cases where both the Department of Justice
and counsel for the refugee claimant cited unpublished decisions. For
example, in a Federal Court case that turned on whether Hungary offers
state protection to members of the Romani community, the Court noted
that the applicant pointed to 14 cases where the Court granted judicial
review of negative refugee determinations involving Hungarian Romani
claimants, one of which was unpublished.124 The government pointed to
five similar cases where judicial review was denied, two of which were
unpublished.125
In many other cases, the Federal Court cited unpublished decisions
without clearly specifying who brought these cases to the Court’s attention.
At times, the Federal Court did so as authority for broad legal principles
such as the principle that corroborating evidence should not be rejected
only because the claimant has been found not to be credible,126 and at times
the Federal Court cited unpublished cases to support its holdings relating
to specific factual scenarios.127
Finally, it is also worth highlighting that in the Federal Court decisions
we examined, there was evidence that IRB Members cited unpublished
Federal Court decisions. For example, in one case the Federal Court noted
that in the underlying refugee determination the Board Member found that
members of a religious minority did not face persecution in a region of
a country and that, in making this finding, the Board Member cited an
unpublished Federal Court decision upholding a similar factual finding on
judicial review.128
It should be noted that the 56 citations we located were merely the
tip of the iceberg. Our methodology would not capture many citations
to unpublished decisions. For example, we would not capture published
decisions that cite unpublished decisions where the latter are not included
in our dataset (because, for example, the cited unpublished case involved
a matter other than refugee judicial reviews, because the cited unpublished
case involved an interlocutory matter rather than a decision on the
124. Varga v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 510 at para 18, citing IMM-1892-12.
125. Ibid at para 19, citing IMM-13187-12 & IMM-6686-13.
126. Valdeblanquez Ortiz v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 410 at para 30, citing
IMM-2416-15.
127. See e.g. Lan Cao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1398 at para 41, citing
IMM-5425-08; Argueta v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1146 at para 30, citing
IMM-4394-10; Csoka v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1220 at para 24, citing
IMM-1675-13; Barajas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 21 at para 72, citing IMM174-09.
128. Lin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 157 at para 16, citing IMM-5425-08. See
also Zhu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1139 at para 53, citing IMM-5425-08.
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merits, or because the cited case was decided outside the period of our
study). We would also not capture citations of unpublished decisions in
unpublished decisions, including in first instance refugee decisions by
the IRB, the vast majority of which are unpublished. And, of course, our
data would not capture citations of unpublished decisions by the parties
in their pleadings—and thus we do not know how often parties are citing
unpublished cases that do not end up being cited by the Court (including,
for example, in cases where they may be persuasive to the Court but where
the Court declines to grant leave and thus does not write reasons).
Notwithstanding these limitations, we were able to locate dozens of
instances where the Federal Court explicitly relied on unpublished refugee
decisions, which provides support for the concerns raised at liaison
committees’ meetings.
6. Judge gender and unpublished decisions
Finally, because some US scholarship has found that the gender of judges
correlates with the likelihood that judges will issue decisions designated
as precedential or non-precedential,129 we looked at whether there were
gender differences in publication rates in our dataset. For refugee Federal
Court decisions on the merits from 2013 to 2015 (i.e. the period where
unpublished decisions were most frequent), we gathered data on the gender
of Federal Court judges. We did so using pronouns as proxies for gender,
based on the pronouns used in online Federal Court judge biographies,130
and, in a small number of cases where no official biography was available,
based on pronouns used in other publicly available online sources.131 This
is admittedly an imperfect categorization system that does not allow for
complex self-identified gender identity and expression, so there is a risk
that our analysis is oversimplified.
As can be seen in Table 3, all judges in this dataset used she/her (17
judges) or he/him (37 judges) pronouns. From 2013 to 2015 judges using
she/her pronouns were almost twice as likely to issue unpublished refugee
judicial review decisions on the merits without reasons (63.7 per cent of
decisions) than judges using he/him pronouns (32.3 per cent of decisions).
We emphasize that this finding is based on a relatively small number of
129. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.)
130. We consulted the current Federal Court website (“Members of the Court”) (last modified 7
June 2022), online: Federal Court <www.fct- cf.gc.ca/en/pages/about-the-court/members-of-thecourt> [perma.cc/AF3M-HKHT]). Where judges had retired, we consulted an internet archive for
this website (“Judges and Prothonotaries”) (last modified 12 December 2012), online: Federal Court
<web.archive.org/web/20131013042121/http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_
en/Bio> [perma.cc/F57B-3C8P]).
131. For example, pronouns in biographies on law firm webpages or pronouns in newspaper stories.
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judges and that our methodology does not examine possible confounding
factors. Caution should therefore be exercised in terms of generalizing
or inferring causation from the correlation that we have observed.
Nonetheless, the gender difference in publication rates does seem striking.
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that, from 2007 to 2018, the Federal Court
issued hundreds of unpublished refugee law judicial review decisions that
were decided on the merits. Reasons were provided to the parties in these
cases, but many were not made (easily) available to the public. There
appears to be some correlation between increased caseload at the Court
and the frequency of unpublished judgments—which corresponds with the
rationale the Court offered for unpublished judgments, namely enhancing
judicial efficiency.
The study also demonstrates that the Federal Court’s practices relating
to unpublished decisions were controversial. Federal Court judges had
strongly divergent views on the appropriateness of unpublished decisions,
with some judges issuing all of their decisions in the form of published
reasons and others issuing almost all of their decisions in the form of
unpublished judgments. When, in 2015, the Federal Court attempted to
clarify its policies through a notice to the bar describing its general practice
whereby judges decided whether their decisions had precedential value
and the Court only published those decisions so-determined, the pushback from lawyers was immediate. This push-back was based in part on
a worry that unpublished decisions could be cited as precedents—which
could generate unfairness because of asymmetrical access to unpublished
decisions, with government lawyers having greater access to unpublished
decisions because the government is a party in all applications for judicial
review. The study has shown that these concerns were justified: unpublished
decisions were cited as precedent by Federal Court judges, by government
lawyers, by IRB Members, and by private bar refugee lawyers.
Finally, this study also raises concerns about the impact of unpublished
decisions on the development of jurisprudence. Some comfort can be taken
in the study’s finding that Federal Court judges do not appear, for the most
part, to have selectively published only decisions where judicial review
was denied (or conversely disproportionately publishing only decisions
where judicial review was granted). However, the study did find striking
correlations between a judge’s gender and the frequency of unpublished
decisions, with judges using she/her pronouns being much more likely
to issue unpublished decisions than judges using he/him pronouns. Much
work has been done to improve the demographic diversity of the Federal
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Court in recent years, including along gender lines.132 Yet this study
points to the worrying possibility that policies limiting publication risk
undermining those advances by amplifying the voices and perspectives
of some judges at the expense of others. If judges from some groups (in
this case judges using he/him pronouns) more frequently determine that
their decisions have precedential value than judges from other groups
(thus resulting in the publication of their decisions), this can amount to
a self-fulfilling prophecy: decisions by those judges are more likely to be
cited in subsequent litigation, and thus the voices and perspectives of such
judges will play a larger role in shaping future decision-making. While
this study considered only gender, literature from other jurisdictions raises
similar worries about judges from other equity-seeking groups, including
racialized minority judges.133
Overall, then, we view the Federal Court’s prior practices of not
publishing supposedly non-precedential decisions described in the 2015
notice as unworkable. The Court was unable to generate consensus either
internally or externally about its no-publication practices—and the practice
thus did not achieve the objective of increasing judicial efficiency. Instead,
it generated disagreement among judges and pushback from the bar. And
it made refugee law judicial reviews less fair, less transparent, and less
equitable. This is to be expected. Our brief overview of the experience in
England, the US, and Canadian provinces shows that no-publication and
no-citation practices are controversial and typically result in pushback—
mostly on the basis that these practices are inconsistent with the important
roles that judicial reasons are expected to play in the legal system.134
While the Federal Court’s earlier policies on unpublished decisions
were, in our view, not successful, we are mindful that the Federal
Court faced several challenges that may have made it attractive to
avoid publishing decisions viewed as having little precedential value.
Unfortunately, the resources provided to the Court do not reflect the volume
and importance of the oversight role that the Court plays in several areas,
132. See Government of Canada, “Changes to the Appointments Process for Federal Judges” (last
modified 1 September 2021), online: Department of Justice Canada <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csjsjc/scapq-pncsq.html> [perma.cc/ML36-2FSW]. See also Kathleen Harris, “The Changing Face of
Canada’s Judiciary: More Women, More Diversity,” CBC News (5 May 2019), online: <www.cbc.
ca/news/politics/judiciary-diversity- appointments-1.5074102> [perma.cc/7TYX-SVNN]. Much
work, however, remains to be done to make the courts reflective of the diversity of the populations
they serve. See e.g. Hallie Cotnam, “Lawyers Pen Open Letter Demanding More Diverse Judiciary,”
CBC News (20 September 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/lawyers-demand-diversejudiciary-appoint-bipoc-vacancies-federal-court-1.5728613> [perma.cc/FJ94-TYGK].
133. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
134. See sections I.2 and I.3 above (at pages 7-16).
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including immigration and refugee law judicial reviews.135 As discussed
in section 4 of the Research Findings, during the study period, the Federal
Court faced chronic shortfalls in its translation budget and was often in a
difficult position in terms of balancing its obligations under the Official
Languages Act with pressures to publish all of its decisions. Another major
resource challenge during the period that this article examines is that the
government was slow to fill judicial vacancies, which created significant
workload pressures for judges.136 Given the correlation observed in this
study between caseload and the frequency of unpublished decisions,137 it
is possible that the pressures caused by these vacancies prompted some
judges to issue a greater number of shorter unpublished “recital”-type
decisions.
One obvious answer to these problems is for the Federal government
to properly resource the Federal Court so that judges have the time that
they need to properly hear, decide, and write reasons and so that the
Federal Court has the capacity to translate those written reasons in a
timely manner. This would ensure that the Federal Court is not put in a
position where it has to make unacceptable trade-offs between efficiency,
controlling costs, fairness, and equity.
Short of this, what other options are available?
One avenue that should be explored is increased research and
scholarship about efficiency in judicial decision-making. We need to know
more about judicial decision-writing, about what supports for judges are
most helpful, and about opportunities for better design in judicial practice.
We also need further research about lessons that can be learned from
different courts and various jurisdictions. For all this to be possible, courts
must be willing to engage with empirically-minded scholars—to share data,
to allow judges and other staff to participate in surveys and interviews, to
participate in research experiments, and to respond to research results.138
135. Rehaag, “Luck I,” supra note 70 at 37; Rehaag, “Luck II,” supra note 76 at 30; “‘It’s Not
Right’: Federal Judge Accuses Government of Chronic Underfunding,” CTV News (27 June 2017),
online:
<www.ctvnews.ca/politics/it-s-not-right-federal-judge-accuses-government-of-chronicunderfunding-1.3479238> [perma.cc/GP3D-TBSS].
136. Tonda MacCharles, “Urgent Need for Judicial Vacancies to Be Filled Promptly: Beverly
McLachlin,” Toronto Star (11 August 2016), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/08/11/
urgent-need-for-judicial-vacancies-to-be-filled-promptly-beverley-mclachlin.html>
[perma.
cc/6CHC-XR42].
137. See section III.2, above (at page 25).
138. For a discussion of the need for such research, see Jon Khan, ‘The Life of a Reserve’: How
Might We Improve the Structure, Content, Accessibility, Length & Timeliness of Judicial Decisions?
(LLM Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2019) at 3, 64-96, 102-104, online (pdf): <tspace.
library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/98120/1/Khan_Jon_%20_201911_LLM_thesis.pdf>
[perma.
cc/8ZM3-BZUK]. See also Jon Khan, “Our Justice System Needs to Be More Than a ‘Zoom Court,’”
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Another avenue that should be explored is for Federal Court judges to
exercise their discretion in ways that can help advance judicial efficiency
by demanding that other institutions do their part to promote efficiency in
the legal system.
In the Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Law Bar Liaison
Committee minutes cited above, one of the rationales offered for
no-publication practices related to what the Chief Justice called the
“overabundance of jurisprudence.”139 Our sense is that one of several
reasons the Federal Court may have reached for no-publication practices
was a concern about the proliferation not just of jurisprudence in general
but of inconsistent jurisprudence. Indeed, in reviewing how unpublished
decisions were cited in our dataset, one can see that lawyers both for the
government and for refugee claimants often cited these decisions where
there was inconsistent jurisprudence—essentially saying “yes, there are
inconsistent cases on this point, but I have more examples of cases that go
my way.”
This is perhaps not surprising. It is well established that refugee law
in Canada has a consistency problem.140 In several core areas, the case law
offers no consistent answers.141 And the problem is even worse with regard
to factual findings. Canada’s legal system provides inconsistent answers
to the questions of whether claimants in country A face persecution,
whether claimants in country B have an internal flight alternative, and
whether claimants in country C are able to access state protection against
persecution. Granted, sometimes this is not really inconsistency but
is instead reflective of the way that answers to these questions must be
highly sensitive to the claimant’s individual circumstances or reflective of
different evidence presented in the cases. But, in many cases, the claimants’
situations and evidence are largely indistinguishable and yet outcomes are
inconsistent.
In our view, there are several ways that problems related to consistency
could be tackled.
One problem is that the IRB has not done as much as it should to
increase consistency in refugee decision-making. The Refugee Appeal
Division has several tools available to enhance consistency in decision-

The Globe and Mail (1 July 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-our-justicesystem-needs-to-be-more-than-a-zoom-court> [perma.cc/9843-RWAH].
139. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
140. Rehaag, “Luck I,” supra note 70; Rehaag, “Luck II,” supra note 76.
141. See e.g. Hilary Evans Cameron, Refugee Law’s Fact-Finding Crisis: Truth, Risk, and the Wrong
Mistake (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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making, but only infrequently chooses to use them.142 Worse, the Refugee
Appeal Division has in recent years reduced the number of decisions it
publishes,143 thereby limiting the degree to which its decisions offer public
and transparent guidance on future decision-making, leaving the matter
largely to the Federal Court. This practice should be rethought.
There are resources in Canadian administrative law that the Federal
Court can use to encourage such a rethink. When the Supreme Court
recently reworked the foundation of administrative law judicial review
in Vavilov, it explicitly acknowledged that some level of inconsistent
decision-making may simply be one of the costs of taking decisionmaking out of the hands of the courts and assigning that decision-making
to administrative tribunals.144 However, the Supreme Court also indicated
that the more robust understanding of reasonableness it set out in Vavilov
provides resources to demand that administrative tribunals address
inconsistency that reaches the level of arbitrariness.145 Specifically, the
Supreme Court noted:
Whether a particular decision is consistent with the administrative body’s
past decisions is also a constraint that the reviewing court should consider
when determining whether an administrative decision is reasonable.
[…T]his does not mean administrative decision makers are bound by
internal precedent in the same manner as courts. Rather, it means that a
decision that departs from longstanding practices or established internal
decisions will be reasonable if that departure is justified, thereby reducing
the risk of arbitrariness, which would undermine public confidence in
administrative decision makers and in the justice system as a whole. …
When evidence of internal disagreement on legal issues has been put
before a reviewing court, the court may find it appropriate to telegraph
the existence of an issue in its reasons and encourage the use of internal
142. IRPA, supra note 66 at s 159(1)(h). For example, the Refugee Appeal Division can issue
jurisprudential guidelines, which decision-makers must either follow or explain why they are not
doing so. See “Policy on the Use of Jurisprudential Guides” (December 2019), online: Immigration
and Refugee Board <irb.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/pages/PolJurisGuide.aspx> [perma.cc/7LG4NVMF]. As of the time of writing, however, there were only three decisions designated as jurisprudential
guidelines: “Jurisprudential guides” (22 December 2020), online: Immigration and Refugee Board
<irb.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/jurisprudential-guides.aspx> [perma.cc/9HZ5-CTA8]. The
Refugee Appeal Division can also strike panels of three members to decide cases, which then bind
other single-member Refugee Appeal Division panels and Refugee Protection Division panels (IRPA,
supra note 66 at ss 163, 171(c)). However, the Refugee Appeal Division seldom strikes such panels.
143. For example, as of the time of writing, there were 358 published decisions on CanLII for 2020,
out of 9,555 finalized Refugee Appeal Division decisions that year. See “Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada - Canada (Federal)” (last visited 15 June 2022), online: CanLII <www.canlii.org/
en/ca/irb> [perma.cc/437X-C2PL] (last accessed 1 May 2021); “Refugee Appeal Statistics” (last
modified 30 May 2022), online: Immigration and Refugee Board <irb.gc.ca/en/statistics/appeals/
Pages/index.aspx>).
144. Vavilov, supra note 17 at para 72.
145. Ibid.
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administrative structures to resolve the disagreement. And if internal
disagreement continues, it may become increasingly difficult for the
administrative body to justify decisions that serve only to preserve the
discord [our emphasis].146

In our view, where Federal Court judges regularly encounter decisions
emanating from the IRB that are so inconsistent as to generate concerns
about arbitrariness, Federal Court judges should follow Vavilov and
demand that the IRB use the tools at its disposal to address those
concerns—and should overturn IRB decisions that fail to offer a reasonable
explanation about how they have avoided arbitrary outcomes in the face of
inconsistent decision-making. A sufficient number of overturned decisions
would strongly incentivize the IRB to play its role in achieving a better
level of consistency. This, in turn, should lead to fewer applications for
judicial review that demonstrate a reasonably arguable case, and thus
that are granted leave. In other words, using administrative law norms to
encourage consistency in administrative decision-making is one way of
reducing the Federal Court’s caseload.
A second problem is that the Federal Court of Appeal has not played
a sufficient role in enhancing consistency in this area. The common law’s
normal answer to inconsistent decision-making among judges on one court
is for the matter to be resolved by binding precedents from higher courts.
In the immigration and refugee law context, however, the Federal Court
of Appeal (and the Supreme Court) can only play this role when allowed
to do so by the Federal Court because immigration and refugee judicial
reviews cannot be appealed unless a question is certified by the Federal
Court judge issuing the decision.147 This makes it possible for competing
lines of Federal Court jurisprudence to persist without the Federal Court of
Appeal being required to resolve the disagreement. In our view, any time
there is disagreement among Federal Court judges (and no determinative
binding appellate precedent resolving the disagreement) on a live issue
in a case, certification for appeal is appropriate. This would increase the
workload of the Federal Court of Appeal, and it would also have resource
implications elsewhere, such as at the Department of Justice and legal
aid programs. But the Federal Court of Appeal should, in our view, be
expected to fulfill its role of ensuring consistent decision-making where
members of the Federal Court are unable to achieve a consensus on their
own. With more frequent guidance from the Federal Court of Appeal, the
problem of litigants citing many competing Federal Court decisions—
146. Ibid at para 131-132.
147. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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leading Federal Court judges to have to work through this competing
jurisprudence in a way that often ends up generating further competing
jurisprudence—would lessen, resulting in increased judicial efficiency
(and, not incidentally, fairer outcomes).
All of this to say that we can understand why the Federal Court may
have reached for no-publication practices to increase judicial efficiency,
to address workload concerns, to deal with resource constraints, and to
reduce the proliferation of precedent. However, we think that there are
other and better ways to address these concerns. As such, we think that the
Federal Court’s earlier no-publication practices discussed in this article
should be treated as a bad precedent, one that should not be followed by
other courts. Instead, other courts should replicate the more recent practice
at the Federal Court of publishing all final decisions on the merits.
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Table 1. Frequency of refugee JR decisions on merits without published reasons*
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Table 2. JR judges, 30+ refugee JR decisions on the merits (2013–2015)*
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Table 3. Judge gender and publication of reasons
in refugee JR decisions on the merits (2013–2015)*

